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Abstract 
In this paper, we report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede 
game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant. Standard backward­
induction arguments lead to a unique Nash equilibrium outcome prediction, which is the 
same as the prediction made by theories of "fair" or "focal" outcomes. 
We find that subjects frequently fail to select the unique Nash outcome prediction. 
While this behavior was also observed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in the "growing 
pie" version of the game they studied, the Nash outcome was not "fair" , and there 
was the possibility of Pareto improvement by deviating from Nash play. Their findings 
could therefore be explained by small amounts of altruistic behavior. There are no Pareto 
improvements available in the constant-sum games we examine, hence explanations based 
on altruism cannot account for these new data. 
We examine and compare two classes of models to explain this data. The first class 
consists of non-equilibrium modifications of the standard "Always Take" model. The 
other class we investigate, the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model, describes an equi­
librium in which subjects make mistakes in implementing their best replies and assume 
other players do so as well. One specification of this model fits the experimental data 
best, among the models we test, and is able to account for all the main features we 
observe in the data. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we report on a series of experiments which produce results not easily 
explained by any of a wide class of game-theoretic or decision theoretic models. The 
type of experiments we consider are closely related to the "centipede games" studied 
by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). Experimental subjects participated in a special form 
of centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players was constant. We refer 
to these games as "constant-sum centipedes games." It is easy to see that standard 
backward-induction arguments lead to a unique Nash equilibrium outcome prediction. 
The Nash outcome is also the only "fair," "focal," or maximin outcome in the game. 
However, subjects in our experiments frequently fail to adopt this outcome. 
While similar behavior was also observed by McKelvey and Palfrey, the "regular" 
centipede games they conducted allowed Pareto improvements over the course of the 
game. Hence, they were able to explain the behavior based on small amounts of altruism. 
There are no Pareto improvements in the constant-sum centipedes we examine. So we 
are unable to explain our findings using similar ideas. 
The class of games we study was first introduced by Rosenthal (1981). Binmore (1987) 
considered a version of Rosenthal's game with 100 moves which he dubbed a "centipede" 
game. Kreps (1990) contains a nice examination of this game, and Megiddo (1986) and 
Aumann (1988) examine a version with exponentially increasing payoffs, rather than lin­
early increasing payoffs .. This latter. game was chosen by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) for 
their experimental study. Other, related experiments include ultimatum games from the 
bargaining literature, studied by Giith et al. (1993) and Thaler (1988). Both McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1992) and Giith et al. (1993) study experiments in which the players' joint 
*This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant #SES-9223701 to the
California Institute of Technology. We thank Bob Forsythe and Ray Jtiezman for help in facilitating the 
use of the experimental laboratory at University of Iowa. We are grateful for comments and suggestions 
from participants at the 1993 ESA Fall Meetings, an editor, and an anonymous referee. 
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payoff increases within the game. In the constant-sum version of the centipede game, 
in contrast to the previously ·cited studies, there are no efficiency gains available; the 
game-theoretic, efficiency, and fairness predictions agree. 
The centipede game is one of a class of games that call into question the common 
knowledge of rationality among players that standard game theory requires. Specifically, 
backward reduction requires that players decide what their "rational" opponent will do 
after a series of "irrational" moves. Indeed, recent work by Basu (1990) and Reny (1993) 
argues that in two-person games with perfect information, no fully rational solution 
concept escapes the paradoxical requirements of players' "rationality." These theoretical 
results are compelling and lead us to believe that any empirically plausible model of game 
play in experiments must allow for an element of irrationality in players' actions. We 
choose to express this by a model that includes "mistakes" by players. 
In the next section we describe the design and procedures of the experiments. In the 
third section we summarize our data and identify its main features. The fourth section 
examines individual behavior in order to uncover evidence of altruistic behavior in our 
experimental subjects. Finding none, the following two sections examine and compare 
several different classes of models to explain the data on our constant-sum centipede 
games. Some explanations we reject out of hand, such as the Rational, Egalitarian, and 
Maximin models. We also describe a class of modified "Always Take" models, which 
we term the Random and Learning models, that admit rigorous statistical testing. As 
an alternative to these non-equilibrium models, we specify a model, called the Quantal 
Response Equilibrium model, in which subjects make mistakes in implementing their 
best replies and assume other players do so as well. Among the models we investigate, 
this Quantal Response Equilibrium model has the best fit and is able to account for all 
the main features we observe in the experimental data. The final section presents our 
conclusions. 
2 Experimental Design 
The constant-sum centipede game we study is a two player game that can be described 
as follows. The game involves a fixed amount of money ($3.20) which is initially divided 
into two equal-size piles ($1.60 each) . Player one has the first move, and can choose to
take one of the piles or to pass. If the first player takes a pile, the other (equal-size) pile
is given to the second player and the game ends. If the first player passes, one fourth 
of one pile is moved to the other pile,. and it .is the second player's move. The second 
player now has the option of taking the big pile and thus leaving the small pile for the 
first player, or choosing to pass. If the second player passes, one fourth of the small pile 
is moved to the big pile, and the move returns to the first player. This continues for a 
predetermined number of moves by each player. Every time a player passes, one fourth 
of the small pile is moved to the large pile. The game ends as soon as either of the players 
chooses to take the big pile. 
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Figure 1: A Ten-Move Constant-Sum Centipede Game. 
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Figure 2: A Six-Move Constant-Sum Centipede Game. 
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We examined two different game lengths. The first game consists of three "innings" , 
for a total of six moves in the whole game. The second game consists of five innings, for 
a total of ten moves. The extensive forms of the ten and six move games are shown in 
Figures 1 and 2, respectively. 
We conducted a total of nine experiments - three experiments on each of three differ­
ent subject pools. The three subject groups used were students from Caltech, Pasadena 
City College, and the University of Iowa. Experiments involving the first two subject 
groups were conducted at the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Po­
litical Science. The third group of experiments were conducted at the University of Iowa. 
The three experiments in each group consisted of two ten-move centipede experiment and 
one six-move experiment. The design of all the experiments is summarized in Table 1.1 
The experimental setup was very similar to that used by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). 
Each experiment used either eighteen or twenty subjects, none of whom had previously 
participated.in any form of centipede experiment. The subjects were divided into two 
equal size groups before the experiment began. We denoted these the Red and Blue 
groups. The subjects then participated in a series of either 9 or 10 matches. In each 
match, a Red subject was matched with a Blue subject, and they participated in a 
constant-sum centipede game. In each game, the Red player moved first, and the Blue 
player moved second. Each subject played against every player in the other group, using 
the matching scheme described in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). This matching scheme 
was designed to eliminate any possible supergame or cooperative behavior. 
In all of the experiments, subjects interacted through computer terminals and were 
not allowed to communicate in any other way. The subjects in a particular experiment 
played the same game form (pictured in Figures 1 or 2) throughout the entire experiment. 
1 We conducted two additional experiments that are not included i'n this analysis. They both used a
different payoff structure than the games presented in this paper. 
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Exp. Subject Game # Matches/ Total # 
# Pool Length Subjects Subject Matches 
1 CIT 10 20 10 100 
2 CIT 10 20 10 100 
3 Iowa 10 20 10 100 
4 Iowa 10 20 10 100 
5 PCC 10 18 9 81 
6 PCC 10 20 10 100 
7 CIT 6 20 10 100 
8 Iowa 6 20 10 100 
9 PCC 6 18 9 81 
Table 1: Experimental Design 
The subjects were allowed to participate only after listening to the instructions contained 
in Appendix 1 and completing a quiz designed to test their knowledge of the rules of the 
game. 
3 Data Overview 
The complete data for the nine experiments are presented in Appendix 2. The results 
are summarized in Table 2, which lists the number and proportion of Takes played at 
each node of the matches in each experiment. 2  
Two features of the data are immediately apparent. First, subjects frequently do not 
play the unique Nash equilibrium prediction of taking at the first move (as little as 22% of 
the time in one of the experiments). Second, there is some variation in outcomes across 
experiments that seems to be linked to the differing subject pools. Second, subjects 
frequently d0 not play the unique Nash equilibrium prediction of taking at the first move 
(as little as 22% of the time in one of the experiments). From Table 2 we see that 
overall, averaging across all experiments and all matches, slightly less than half of the 
observations correspond to the Nash equilibrium. Even in experiment #8, the most 
favorable from the standpoint of the game theoretic prediction, in nearly a quarter of the 
matches there was at least one pass. Considering only the ten-move centipede games, 
we see that in no session did less than 40% of the red subjects choose Pass at the first 
node.3  
A different description of the strategic choices being made by the subjects is  given by 
2We number nodes in the game tree from 0 to 9 for the ten-move sessions, and 0 to 5 for the six-move 
experiments. 
3The results are even more striking at the individual level, where·we find that over 80% of the red 
subjects passed in at least one of the matches they played. This is discussed in a later section. 
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Exp. 
# 
1 
CIT-10 
2 
CIT-10 
3 
UI-10 
4 
UI-10 
5 
PCC-10 
6 
PCC-10 
Pooled 
10 move 
7 
CIT-6 
8 
UI-6 
9 
PCC-6 
Pooled 
6 move 
0 1 2 
.57 .31 .11 
(57) (31) (11) 
.51 .36 .12 
(51) (36) (12) 
.60 .28 .12 
(60) (28) (12) 
.38 .36 .18 
(38) (36) (18) 
.42 .40 .09 
(34) (32) (7) 
.22 .23 .26 
(22) (23) (26) 
.45 .32 .14 
(262) (186) (86) 
.62 .31 .07 
(62) (31) (7) 
.77 .23 0 
(77) (23) 0 
. 33 .48 .15 
(27) (39) (12) 
.59 .33 .07 
(166) (93) (19) 
Number of Passes* 
3 4 5 6 
.00 .01 0 0 
(0) (1) 0 0 
.00 .01 0 0 
(0) (1) 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
.06 .01 .00 .01 
(6) (1) (0) (1) 
.05 .02 .02 0 
(4) (2) (2) 0 
.13 .08 .06 .01 
(13) (8) (6) (1) 
.04 .02 .01 .003 
(23) (13) (8) (2) 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
.02 .01 0 0 
(2) (1) 0 0 
.007 .003 0 0 
(2) (1) 0 0 
7 8 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
.00 .00 
(0) (0) 
.00 .00 
(0) (0) 
Table 2: Proportions of matches ending at each outcome 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
.01 
(1) 
.001 
(1) 
*The number in parentheses is the number of observations at that node in the game tree.
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
the implied take probabilities at various nodes within a match. These are the aggregate 
conditional frequencies of players choosing Take, given that a particular node has been 
reached. Thus, the implied take probability qi is our estimate of the likelihood that a 
player who faces a choice at node i will choose Take at that node. For each experiment, 
we have shown the implied probability of taking at each node with a significant number 
of observations. 4 Figure 3 graphs these implied take probabilities for the six ten-move 
experiments, and Figure 4 presents the results from the three six-move experiments. 
It is clear from the bar graphs that with the possible exception of experiment #5, 
the implied take probabilities are increasing along the game tree. In other words, on 
average, within a particular match, subjects are more likely to choose Take after several 
passes than after fewer passes. Apparently, subjects use strategies that have systematic 
differences at different nodes of the game. This is a feature observed by McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1992), and it should be accounted for by any model of the subjects\ behavior. 
Insert figures 3 and 4 about here. 
In addition to strategic variation within matches, we are interested in behavioral 
differences across matches. Specifically, we seek to determine whether the subjects' 
performance changes with experience. Table 3 presents the implied take probabilities for 
the first and last five matches in each experiment. In almost every case, no matter how 
far out in the game, subjects are more likely to choose Take in the later matches than in 
the earlier ones. We also examined the cumulative frequencies of outcomes, derived by 
summing the outcome proportions in the first and last five matches of each experiment. 
We observed that, with the exception of experiment #5, the distribution of outcomes in 
later matches are stochastically dominated by the earlier matches. 5 Thus, subjects choose 
Take at nodes closer to the start of the game as they play more. So this is another feature 
that any potential model must explain - subjects play "closer" to the Nash prediction as 
they gain more experience in the game. This was included as a learning parameter in 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) . 
As we have shown, there are two main features of the data we would like to explain. 
First, within matches, players are increasingly more likely to choose Take as moves are 
passed back and forth. Second, across matches, players are increasingly more likely to 
choose Take as they gain experience with the game. 
4We have eliminated nodes with fewer than ten observations. 
5It should be noted that the differences in the cumulative frequencies for experiment #5 are very 
small and do not suggest that subjects move farther from the Nash equilibrium over time. 
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Exp. Match Conditional Probabilities* 
# Group Po P1 P2 p3 p4 p5 Pa p7 PB p9 
1 <6 .46 .70 .88 .00 1.00 
(50) (27) (8) (1) (1) 
CIT-10 >5 .68 .75 1.00 
(50) (16) (4) 
2 <6 .34 .64 .92 .00 1.00 
(50) (33) (12) (1) (1) 
CIT-10 >5 .68 .94 1.00 
(50) (16) (1) 
3 <6 .48 .65 1.00 
(50) (26) (9) 
UI-10 >5 .72 .79 1.00 
(50) (14) (3) 
4 <6 .32 .38 .67 .71 .50 .00 1.00 
(50) (34) (21) (7) (2) (1) (1) 
UI-10 >5 .44 .82 .80 1.00 
(50) (28) (5) (1) 
5 <6 .40 .67 .56 .50 .50 1.00 
(45) (27) (9) (4) (2) (1) 
PCC-10 >5 .44 .70 .33 .50 .50 1.00 
(36) (20) (6) (4) (2) (1) 
6 <6 .22 .15 .36 .42 .50 .67 .50 .00 .00 1.00 
(50) (39) (33) (21) (12) (6) (2) (1) (1) (1) 
PCC-10 >5 .22 .44 .64 .50 .50 1.00 
(50) (39) (22) (8) (4) (2) 
7 <6 .48 .73 1.00 
(50) (26) (7) 
CIT-6 >5 .76 1.00 
(50) (12) 
8 <6 .70 1.00 
(50) (15) 
UI�6 >5 .84 1.00 
(50) (8) 
9 <6 .20 .67 .75 .67 1.00 
(45) (36) (12) (3) (1) 
PCC-6 >5 .50 .83 1.00 
(36) (18) (3) 
Table 3: Implied Take Probabilities Across Matches 
*The number in parentheses is the number of observations at that node in the game tree.
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4 Altruism and Individual Behavior 
This section examines the individual behavior of the experimental subjects in order to 
examine the Altruism model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) as applied to the data 
reported here on the constant-sum centipede game. Many of the qualitative features we 
have just described for the constant-sum centipede game are shared by the data reported 
by McKelvey and Palfrey. It is natural to investigate whether similar conclusions can be 
drawn about explanations for the data. In fact, the constant-sum games were designed 
to test the earlier explanation of passing behavior in centipede games. 
A general approach to understanding the actions of experimental subjects postulates 
that the subject pools we draw from are composed of several different types of players, 
each with a different utility function. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) used a version of 
this idea that they termed the Altruism model. 6 Specifically, the authors SUf>posed that 
individuals in their experiments were either selfish or altruistic. Altruists attempted to 
maximize the social gains available in the experiment. Selfish subjects simply maximized 
their own expected utility, given their beliefs about the mix of subject types in the 
experiment. Thus, in equilibrium selfish subjects mimic altruists by passing with some 
probability in the early stages of a match. A key finding of McKelvey and Palfrey was 
that the presence of a small percentage of altruists (approximately 5%) was able to 
account for most of the systematic patterns in their data. Given the joint benefits from 
choosing Pass in the centipede games they studied, McKelvey and Palfrey defined an 
altruist as "an individual who always chooses Pass" (p. 812) . They observed a total of 
9 subjects out of 138 who met this definition of altruism. These 9 subjects consisted of 
5 Red subjects and 4 Blue subjects. More striking, they observed that "only 1 out of all 
138 subjects chose Take at every opportunity" (p. 811). 
In our experiments, there are no joint benefits from choosing Pass, thus altruism 
carries no prediction for these experiments. However, one possible explanation for the 
data is that there are subjects who, for some reason (perhaps "reciprocation" ) play the 
same role in our experiments as the altruists in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), and always 
choose Pass. Thus, we investigate whether such subjects exist in our constant-sum games. 
qur findings 
·for the constant-sum centipede are given in Table 4. It is clear that subjects 
are behaving much differently in the constant-sum game. Out of 176 subjects, 45 chose 
Take at every opportunity7 and only 2 chose Pass at every opportunity. Both of these 
findings are in sharp contrast to the data reported by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) . 
Table 4 also reveals some differences in the strategies used by the Red and Blue 
subjects. Because of. the sequential .nature .of the .game, .a Blue. player is allowed the 
chance to move only if the Red player matched against her chooses Pass. Thus, while Red 
subjects make at least one choice in every match, the Blue subjects can have significantly 
6Similar approaches appear in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) and Cooper et al. (1989). 
7In other words, over 25% of our subjects are perfectly consistent with the benchmark "Always Take" 
models. This suggests that a mixed model with multiple "types" might fit our data quite well. See El­
Gamal and Grether (1993) and Stahl and Wilson (1993) for two different approaches to estimating 
mixture models with experimental data. 
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Exp. Subject All Takes All Passes Total 
# Pool Red Blue Red Blue Players 
1 CIT-10 3 4 0 2 20 
2 CIT-10 2 3 0 0 20 
3 Ul-10 3 3 0 0 20 
4 UI-10 1 1 0 0 20 
5 PCC-10 1 3 0 0 18 
6 PCC-10 1 0 0 0 20 
7 CIT-6 3 6 0 0 20 
8 Ul-6 1 9 0 0 20* 
9 PCC-6 0 1 0 0 18 
ALL 15 30 0 2 176 
Table 4: Classification of Strategies Used by Experimental Subjects 
*Includes one Blue player with no observed actions.
fewer opportunities. Indeed, in experiment #8, Blue player #10 did not make a single 
choice! The Red subjects matched against Blue #10 choose Take at the first node in 
every match. Therefore, some of the observed differences between Red and Blue subjects 
may be due to the lack of observations for the Blue subjects' behavior. 
This phenomenon also calls into question our weak findings on subjects who always 
Pass. Significantly, there are no Red subjects who chose Pass at every opportunity; both 
are Blue subjects. But in one case, this classification rests on only three choices and in 
the other, it depends on only five choices. It seems reasonably likely that if these Blue 
subjects were given as many opportunities as the Red subjects, they would sometimes 
choose Take. 8 
We conclude that there is no evidence of altruism in our experimental data; a finding 
in sharp contrast to the centipede experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). This is 
not surprising, given the constant-sum nature of the games reported here. It does cast 
doubt on the explanation offered for the earlier data of McKelvey and Palfrey. It also 
forces us to consider some alternative explanations for the constant-sum data reported 
here. We do so in the next section. 
8Despite the evidence that there do not seem to be players that always pass, we have estimated a 
version of the model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) on the six-move constant-sum experiments. As 
expected, we find a worse.fit to our experimental data,·onthe whole,. than.offured ,by the models estimated 
in the previous section. 
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5 Models 
In this section, we describe several different models which might be proposed to account 
for the data. In order to justify our conclusions, our main interest is in models that 
generate testable predictions. This testing, using standard econometric methods, will 
be discussed in the next section. It should be noticed that with several of the models 
outlined in this section some latitude exists regarding how a model might best be applied 
to the experiments we conducted. These complications will also be dealt with later. 
The "Always Take" Models 
The first model of behavior we describe is the usual Nash equilibrium prediction, which 
we term the Rational model. By a standard backward induction argument,· the unique 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium9 to the constant-sum centipede game is for both sub­
jects to take with probability one at every opportunity. This model predicts that, fol­
lowing backward induction, every match will end with the Red player taking at the first 
node. Sharing this prediction is the Egalitarian model. In our experiments, the principle 
of equal division is both intuitively "fair" and has the enviable distinction of being a 
Pareto efficient "equitable allocation." 10 In addition to this "fairness" property, equal di­
vision is also an obvious "focal" point of the game since it is the only symmetric outcome 
in the game that is possible to achieve. As equal payoffs can only be guaranteed at the 
initial node of the game, the Egalitarian model also predicts that every match will end 
with Red taking at the first node. This prediction is also common to the Maximin model, 
in which players maximize their minimum payoff. This can be viewed as an extreme form 
of risk aversion. It is clear that players acting in this way will choose Take at their first 
opportunity, as passing at any node risks a lower payoff. 
The three models we have described so far, which we refer to collectively as the 
"Always Take" models, share the common prediction that the Red player takes at the 
first node of the game. This is a point prediction, in that the models rule out any other 
outcome as impossible. Econometrically, this makes it impossible to specify the likelihood 
of our data, which contain prohibited outcomes. The point predictions of these models 
also rule out any kind of errors or experimentation by the players. This is a weakness of 
these simple models. 
In order to give the "Always Take" model a fair shake, we consider next a statistical 
version of that model. A modified "Always Take" model, which we call the Random 
model, assumes that every player, at every node reached in every match, chooses Take 
with a fixed probability p and chooses Pass with probability 1 - p. Estimates of p close
9In fact, any Nash equilibrium to the constant-sum centipede involves the first player taking at the 
first node. Given this fact, all of the usual refinements of Nash equilibrium make the same prediction. 
Thus, "traditional" game theory makes a unambiguous prediction about play. 
10 An "equitable allocation" in welfare economics is an allocation such that no agent prefers the bundle 
of any other agent to his own. See Varian (1984). 
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to 1 would indicate that the "Always Take" model does fairly well in explaining our data. 
However, since our data appears to have trends in p within and across matches, we would 
expect this model to explain the data rather poorly. 
A further modified "Always Take" model, the Learning model, is actually a combina­
tion of the random and rational models. It assumes that subjects gradually change their 
behavior as they gain experience, moving from the random model to the rational model. 
Thus, this model assumes that p varies over time, increasing with experience. However, 
it maintains the assumption that p is the same at all nodes within a match.11 Recall that 
Table 3 showed that these implied take probabilities are not constant. 
It is important to note that the Random and Learning models do not require that 
subjects act with little or no deterministic intent. The Random model can be inter­
preted as a particular specification of the error structure in the Rational or .Egalitarian 
model. Thus, if subjects adopt a common (best) strategy that they can only imperfectly 
implement, they would fall under the Random model. In other words, subjects playing 
the game with good intentions but "trembling" hands could be described by the Ran­
dom or Learning models.12 However, this "noisy play" interpretation assumes a very 
simplistic model of errors which is not internally consistent. Specifically, these models 
do not allow players to take into account the errors that other players make. The next 
model overcomes this deficiency by offering an internally consistent description of play 
by error-prone agents. 
The Quanta! Response Equilibrium Model 
Building off econometric models of discrete choice, the Quantal Response Equilibrium 
model parametrically describes the actions (and equilibrium play) of subjects who imper­
fectly implement their best replies.13 In this model, sophisticated players play mutually 
consistent strategies with the knowledge that other players may make mistakes in their 
choice of action. These mistakes have the feature that "costlier" (in terms of expected 
payoff) mista,kes are less likely.14 Thus, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model has the 
advantage that it has a plausible theoretical foundation. It is the only equilibrium model 
we investigate that accommodates mistakes by players. The model is also unique in that 
it can capture the changing pattern of behaviors both within and across matches. The 
statistical specification and estimation of this model are presented in the next section. 
11This assumption is maintained in order to keep the number of free parameters in the model tractable. 
12These trembles are"real" in the sense that we do not view them in the limit as they vanish to zero, 
rather we suppose there is a detectable level of error in our subjects' play. 
13The general theoretical development of this model is presented in McKelvey and Palfrey (1994) and 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1993). Similar approaches are analyzed in Rosenthal (1989) and Zauner (1993). 
14This feature is also present in the related work of Beja (1992) on "imperfect equilibrium." 
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6 Estimation 
In this section, we statistically evaluate the non-deterministic models described in the 
previous section. We begin by selecting a formulation which incorporates all of the 
"Always Take" models described in the previous section. We define Pt as the probability
that a player will choose Take at any node of the match she plays in match number 
t.15 We attempt to account for learning over time by allowing the probability of a Take
to change as each subsequent match is played. We select the following, exponential 
specification for the process by which Pt changes:
Pt = 1 - (1 -Po)e-at
where p0 and a are parameters to be estimated. This specification has several appealing
features. First, it has two structural parameters which have clear interpretations: p0 is the
probability of Take used by subjects in the first match of the experiment and a represents 
the learning rate of the subjects. Second, it allows for a non-linear learning dynamic, 
instead of requiring a constant rate of learning. Third, this specification encompasses 
several of the "Always Take" models as special cases. The Rational, Egalitarian and 
Maximin models are obtained when p0 = 1. The Random model is obtained when a = 0,
and the Learning model is obtaine_d when there are no constraints on the two parameters, 
Po and a. 
In order to estimate these parameters, we define the likelihood function for our data. 
Let M be the total number of matches in the experiment, indexed by i = 1, ... , M. Our 
data consists of ni, the final node reached in a particular match i, as well as ti, the match 
number. With this notation, the log likelihood function for our data is given by 
M M 
logL = :L: log(l - (1-po)e-at;) + 2: ni log(( l  -p0)e-at;) 
i=l i=l 
Table 5 reports the results of maximum likelihood estimation of the unknown param­
eters p0 and ·a. First, we recall that we can reject out of hand the pure versions of the
Rational, Egalitarian, and Maximin models, as they all share the common prediction of 
Take at the first node. Each of the experiments has .zero likelihood under any of these 
models, for reasons we have already mentioned. 
Regarding the Random model, the table also reports tests for the significance of 
a = 0. These tests are done using the -2(log L - log Le) chi-squared likelihood ratio
test, where log Le represents the log-likelihood under the constrained model in which 
a = 0. In the overall data as well as in six of the nine experiments, we reject the 
hypothesis of no learning at conventional significance levels. The Learning model picks 
up the unraveling of behavior across matches. However, by its very nature, the model is 
incapable of explaining the increasing probability of Take within a match. 
15We number the matches played in an experiment from 0 to 8 or 9, depending on the number of 
subjects in the experiment. 
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Exp. f Subject
# f Pool
1 CIT-10 
2 CIT-10 
3 UI-10 
4 UI-10 
5 PCC-10 
6 PCC-10 
Po 
0.526 
0.416 
0.496 
0.380 
0.554 
0.254 
MLE 
-logL I 
0.0683 101.19 
0.117** 104.13 
0.1067** 94.15 
0.0568* 136.04 
-0.0198 108.54 
0.0335* 184.72 
I Pooled I 10 move I 0.410 I 0.0531 ** I 764. 78 I 
7 CIT-6 0.511 0.1292** 85.61 
8 UI-6 0.702 0.1225 57.62 
9 PCC-6 0.367 0.0917** 102.84 
I Pooled I 6 move I 0.493 I 0.1212** I 257.45 I 
Table 5: MLE of Learning model parameters 
*Significant at the .05 level.
**Significant at the .01 level. 
We now turn to the statistical specification and estimation of the Quantal Response 
Equilibrium model. Recall that one key feature of the model is that costly mistakes are 
less likely to made by players in the game. We now define a specific quantal response 
function with this feature to use in our equilibrium analysis. In our setting, suppose that 
a player at node j in match number t faces a choice between Take, with payoff ur, and 
Pass, with expected payoff up. Then the logistic response function gives the probability 
pf that the player will play Take as
. e..\UT 1 
m = eAUT + e..\up = l + e>.(up-UT)
where A 2: 0 is a parameter which is inversely related to the level of error. Specifically, 
A = 0 mean·s that a player's choice is totally random (corresponding to p = ! in the
last estimate), as Take and Pass are equally likely regardless of the relative expected 
payoffs. Also, A = oo means that a player's choice is perfectly rational and exhibits 
no error; the highest expected payoff choice will be played with certainty. Intermediate 
values of A generate varying levels of "noisy play" of the game. An important aspect 
of this specification is that the probability of implementing a choice is increasing in the 
equilibrium expected payoff of the .choice. Thus, the mer-e costly a mistake would be (in 
expected payoff), the less likely the player is to make that mistake. 
Moreover, the error structure of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model is common 
knowledge; there is no incomplete information or "mimicking" behavior. However, the 
possibility of errors, and players' active adjustment to take advantage of this possibility, 
can account for much of what is usually explained by these ·techniques. In order to show 
this by estimating the parameters of the model, we must derive the logistic Quantal 
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Response Equilibrium (QRE) of our game. We start at the last decision node of the 
game, where a Blue player would face a choice between Take and Pass with fixed monetary 
payoffs. A simple computation gives pf, the probability that Blue will choose Take at 
N, the final node of the game.16 Given this decision probability, we can compute the 
expected payoff of a Pass by a Red player at the second to last node of the game. This 
value yields pf-1, the take probability of the second to last node. With this, we can 
calculate the expected payoff of the choices faced by a Blue player at her second to last 
decision node. Note that these calculations account for mistakes that both she and her 
opponent might make if she chooses Pass. We continue these calculations backwards 
from the last node of the game until we obtain a complete vector of equilibrium take 
probabilities, Pt = {PL . . .  , pf}.17
This process is illustrated in Figure 5, which graphs the equilibrium take probabilities, 
Pt, generated by various values of A in the six-move constant-sum centipede game. In the 
figure, A values are displayed on the horizontal axis on a geometric scale and the various 
take probabilities are shown as labeled. The figure shows that, as noted above, A = 0 
corresponds to completely random play at all nodes and A = oo corresponds to errorless 
play - the Nash prediction of Take with probability 1 at every node. For intermediate 
values of A, the model makes a specific prediction about the complete vector of take 
probabilities, as shown in the figure. The results of the Quanta! Response Equilibrium 
model for the ten-move game is similar. 
Insert figure 5 about here. 
In order to construct the likelihood function for the logistic specification of the 
Quanta! Response Equilibrium model, we use the equilibrium take probabilities to ob­
tain predicted frequencies of outcomes. Specifically, we let fl = Pt, ft2 = (1 - Pt )PF, ft = (1 - pt) (l - pF)p�, etc. Of course, these values are all derived for a specific value of
A, which is common to all players. Different values of.A will lead to different predicted 
outcome frequencies. Indeed, we observe such differences across matches in our experi­
ments. The Quantal Response Equilibrium model can easily capture this by supposing 
that the (common) A value changes over time. Specifically, we assume that 
At = Ao+ {3t
where Ao is the initial value and f3 represents the rate of change over time. As A is
inversely related to the level of error, the natural interpretation is that as players gain 
16For example, in the ten-move game, the Blue player can take $3.08 or play Pass and receive $0.09. 
We calculate pf= 1/(1 + e-X(-z.99)). If>.= 1, then pf= 0.952.
17This procedure is also used by Zauner (1993) with a different error structure to analyze the centipede 
experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). 
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Exp. Subject MLE Vuong 
# Pool Ao f3 - logL Stat. 
1 CIT-10 0.745 0.128 98.62 -0.909 
2 CIT-10 0.298 0.314** 97. 18 -2.679** 
3 Ul-10 0.684 0.232** 90.56 -1 .551 
4 Ul-10 0.032 0.142* 133.30 -1 . 169 
5 PCC-10 0.769 -0.095 107.09 -1 .021 
6 PCC-10 -0.479 0.094 198.49 3. 173**
I Pooled I 10 move I -0.028 I 0.103** I 764.08 I -0. 157
7 CIT-6 0.827 0.324** 79.48 -2.949** 
8 Ul-6 2. 184 0.343* 52.42 -3.415** 
9 PCC-6 0.376 0.201* 96.96 -2.596** 
I Pooled I 6 move I 0.683 I 0.292** I 243.57 I -3.314** I 
Table 6: MLE for Quantal Response Equilibrium model (logistic specification) 
*Significant at the .05 level.
**Significant at the .01 level. 
more experience they are less prone to make mistakes. Thus, if we again let ni represent 
the final node reached in a particular match i, the log likelihood function is given by 
M 
log L = L log[(ft[Ao, f3])n;] 
i=l 
where Mis the total number of matches in the experiment. 
Table 6 reports the estimates of Ao and f3 for the Quantal Response Equilibrium model
in each of the experiments. We again use the -2(log L - log Le) chi-squared likelihood 
ratio test to reject the hypothesis that f3 = 0 in six of our experiments, 18 at conventional
confidence levels. Thus, we conclude that in most cases there is a learning trend in the 
direction of fewer errors in the later stages of the experiments. 
At this stage, we have parameter estimates for both the Learning model and the 
Quantal Response Equilibrium model. The next question to address is which model 
better explains the data, the modified "Always Take" model or the Quantal Response 
Equilibrium model. As both models generate predicted frequencies which are compared 
to the actual data to produce likelihood scores, we can compare these log-likelihood scores 
to determine which model fits the data better. The results are striking. In eight of the 
nine individual experiments, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model does better. 
As the Quantal Response Equilibrium model is not nested with the Learning model, 
we cannot use the standard chi-squared likelihood ratio test to determine if these dif-
18Learning is significant in all of the six-move games but only half of the ten-move games. Error rates 
in ten-move games appear to be somewhat higher overall, as well. 
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ferences are significant. We instead use Vuong's (1989) model selection test for strictly 
non-nested models. This test· is based on the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood 
ratio statistic under general conditions. In Table 6 we report the Vuong test statistic, the
difference in the maximum log-likelihood values for the two models suitably normalized, 
for each of the experiments and the pooled ten-move game and pooled six-move game 
data. This test statistic is to be compared to a critical value c from the standard normal 
distribution for some significance level. If the test statistic is smaller than -c, then we 
can reject the null hypothesis that the models are equivalent in favor of the Quanta! 
Response Equilibrium model being better than the Learning model. The opposite con­
clusion is reached when the test statistic is larger than c. Finally, if the test statistic is 
between -c and c, we cannot discriminate between the two competing models given the 
data, at that significance level. 
Of the eight experiments with a lower log likelihood under the Quanta! Response 
Equilibrium model, four have likelihood ratios that select this model over the Learning 
model, at the .01 level. This includes all of the six-move sessions. In addition, the pooled 
six-move game data selects the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model at the same signifi­
cance level. The other four experiments individually and the pooled ten-move data do not 
offer differences significant enough for model selection.19 Therefore we reject the Learn­
ing model in favor of the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model in the six-move games. 
While we cannot reject the Learning model outright in the ten-move centipede games, 
these data support the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model more than the Learning 
model. 
The Quanta! Response Equilibrium model not only fits well, it also accounts for the 
two main features of the data that we listed in a previous section. First, for the equilib­
rium vector of take probabilities Pt, we find that the predicted take probabilities increase 
with later nodes in the game. Figure 5 illustrates this for the six-move centipede game. 
For all ,\ values we estimate, later nodes of the game correspond to larger equilibrium 
take probabilities. Thus, the model captures the feature that within matches, players 
are more likely to choose Take at later nodes. The second main feature of our data 
is that across matches, players are more likely to choose Take as they gain experience 
with the ga�e. The Quanta! Response Equilibrium model captures this by allowing the 
value of,\ to change over time. Again this is illustrated for the six-move game by Fig­
ure 5. As the curves in the figure are all increasing, higher values of ,\ (over time) lead 
to higher equilibrium take probabilities. Therefore, the Quanta! Response Equilibrium 
model accommodates our main qualitative findings, in addition to offering the best fit of 
the experimental data among our models. 
19Experiment # 6 has a test statistic that indicates that the data from the experiment is better 
explained by the Learning model. It also contains a much lower rate of Taking than in the other 
experiments. 
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7 Conclusion 
We have proposed several different models for our data on constant-sum centipede games. 
We find that the Rational, Egalitarian and Maximin models do not fare well, even when 
adapted to allow for statistical behavior. The Random model does not explain unraveling 
across experiments. The Learning model fits the behavior across matches relatively well, 
but it does not account for the finding that subjects take with increasing probability 
within a match. Also, it is a model that is not internally consistent, in that if subjects 
knew the model that was estimated, best response behavior by the subjects would lead to 
different data. Finally, variants of the incomplete information model used in McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1992) are implausible here because altruistic behavior does not imply that a 
subject should ever (much less always) pass. Further, even if some other rationale could 
be found for subjects always passing (such as reciprocation), there is no evidence in the 
data that such individuals exist. 
Among the models we evaluate, the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model best ex­
plains the data. It offers a better fit than the Learning model and, as it is an equilib­
rium model, is internally consistent. It also accounts for the pattern of increasing take 
probabilities within a match. These facts lend strong support to the Quanta! Response 
Equilibrium model. 
The results reported here suggest a natural further test of the Quanta! Response 
Equilibrium model. The Altruism explanation offered by McKelvey and Palfrey for their 
data seems doubtful given our finding that there is no evidence of altruism in the constant­
sum centipede data. This suggests that this earlier data needs to be reexamined, and we 
believe such an analysis with the Quanta! Response Equilibrium model would be very 
successful. 
17 
Appendix 1: Experiment Instructions 
DECISION MAKING EXPERIMENT 
This is an experiment in group decision making, and you will be paid for your par­
ticipation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different subjects may earn different 
amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of 
others, and partly on chance. 
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all_interaction 
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk 
or in any way try to communicate with other subjects during the experiments. If you 
disobey the rules, we will have to ask you to leave the experiment. 
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will 
be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the 
computers. You must take a quiz after the instruction period. So it is important that 
you listen carefully. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your 
hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise 
after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and 
assist you. 
You have been divided into two groups, with 10 subjects each. The groups are called 
the RED group and the BLUE group. If you chose BLUE, you will be BLUE for the 
entire experiment. If you chose RED, you will be RED for the entire experiment. Please 
remember your color, because the instructions are slightly different for the BLUE and 
the RED subjects. 
[DISPLAY PAYOFF TABLE] 
In this experiment, you will be making the following decision, for real money. 
First, you are matched with a subject of the other color. There is a sum of money, 
divided into two equal piles, the Top pile, and the Bottom pile. At the beginning of the 
match the Top Pile has $1 .60 and the Bottom Pile has $1.60. 
RED has the first move and can either "Pass" or "Take" . If RED chooses "Take" , 
RED gets the Top Pile of $1.60, BLUE gets the Bottom pile of $1 .60 cents, and the 
match is over. If RED chooses "Pass" , one fourth of the Bottom Pile is moved into the 
Top Pile, and it is BLUE's turn. 
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The Top Pile now contains $2.00 and the Bottom Pile $1.20. BLUE can take or pass. 
If BLUE takes, BLUE ends up with the Top pile of $2.00 and RED ends up with the 
Bottom pile of $1.20 and the match is over. If BLUE passes, one fourth of the Bottom 
Pile is moved into the Top Pile, and it is RED's turn again. 
This continues for a total of ten [six] moves, or five [three] moves for each subject. 
On each move, if a subject takes, he or she gets the Top pile, the other subject gets the 
Bottom pile, and the match is over. If he or she passes, one fourth of the Bottom Pile is 
moved to the Top Pile, and it is the other subject's turn. 
The last move of the match is move ten [six], and is BLUE's move, if the match 
gets this far. The Top pile now contains $3.08 [$2.82] and the Bottom pile contains 
$0.12 [$0.38]. If BLUE takes, BLUE gets the Top pile of $3.08 [$2.82] and RED gets the 
Bottom pile of $0.12 [$0.38] cents. If BLUE passes, then one fourth of the Bottom pile is 
moved to the Top Pile. RED then gets the Top Pile, containing $3.11 [$2.92] and BLUE 
gets the Bottom Pile, containing $0.09 [$0.28]. 
[GO OVER THE TABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT IS IN EACH CELL] 
[DISPLAY MATCHING SCHEME] 
The experiment consists of 10 matches. In each match, you are matched with a 
different subject of the other color from yours. Thus, if you are a BLUE subject, in each 
match, you will be matched with a RED subject. If you are a RED subject, in each 
match you are matched with a BLUE subject. In the first match, you are matched with 
the subject of the other color with the same number as yours. So Red #1 is matched 
with Blue #1, Red #2 is matched with Blue #2, etc. In each successive match if you 
are Red, you are matched with Blue subject with the next higher number. If you are 
Blue, you are matched with the Red subject with the next lower number. So in match 
2, Red #1 is matched with Blue #2, Red #2 with Blue #3, etc. Since there are ten 
subjects of each color, this means that you will be matched with each of the subjects of 
the other color exactly once. So if your label is RED, you will be matched with each of 
the BLUE subjects exactly once. If you are BLUE, you will be matched with each of 
the RED subjects exactly once. 
[PAUSE FOR QUESTIONS] 
We will now begin the computer instruction session. During the instruction session, 
we will teach you how to use the computer by going through a few practice matches. 
During the instruction session, do not hit any keys until you are told to do so, and 
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when you are told to enter information, type exactly what you are told to type.
You are not paid for these practice matches. 
Please turn on your computer now by pushing the button labeled "MASTER" on the 
right hand side of the panel underneath the screen. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO TURN ON COMPUTERS] 
When the computer prompts you for your name, type your full name. Then hit the 
ENTER key. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO ENTER NAMES] 
When you are asked to enter your color, type R if your color is RED, and B if your 
color is BLUE. Then hit ENTER. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECT'S TO ENTER COLORS] 
You now see the experiment screen. The screen is divided into three sections. The top 
of the screen tells you the current match number, your subject number and the subject 
number of the subject with whom you are currently matched. The center of the screen 
shows the payoff table. This is the same as the table that was just displayed. The bottom 
of the screen tells you what is currently happening, and prompts you for input. Since the 
experiment has not begun yet, the bottom part of the screen simply tells you to wait. Is 
there anyone whose color is not correct? 
[WAIT FOR RESPONSE] 
Please record your color and subject number on the top left hand corner of your 
record sheet. Also record the number of the subject you are matched against in the first 
match. 
We will now start the first practice match. Remember, do not hit any keys until you 
are told to so. 
[MASTER HIT KEY] 
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You now see on the bottom part of the screen that the first match has begun. If you 
are a RED subject, you are tGld that it is your move, and are given a description of the 
choices available to you. If you are a BLUE subject, you are told that it is the other 
subjects move, and are told the choices available to the other subject. On the payoff 
table, you see that there are two sets of red arrows pointing to the first column of the 
table. This indicates that it is the first move of the match and that it is the Red subject's 
turn. 
Will all the RED subjects now choose PASS by typing a P on your terminals now. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE] 
Notice that the two sets of red arrows on the payoff table have now moved to the 
second column and are Blue. This indicates that Red chose Pass, and that it is now 
the second move, which is Blue's turn. Note that the Bottom pile has decreased by one 
fourth to $1.20 and the top pile has increased to $2.00. 
On the bottom part of the screen, the BLUE subjects are now told that it is their 
turn to choose, and are told the choices they can make. The RED subjects are told that 
it is the other subject's turn to choose, and are told the choices that their other subject 
can make. 
Will all the BLUE subjects now please choose TAKE by typing T at your terminal 
now. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE] 
Since BLUE chose T, the first match has ended. This is indicated on the payoff table 
by the fact that the double set of arrows is now white, and point to the second column. 
The payoff to you and your opponent in the highlighted column, and are also recorded 
below the payoff table. 
Despite the fact that your match is over (in fact all matches are over) , the program 
requires that you enter a response at each turn. The computer will prompt you to hit 
"y" and return until each subject has entered a total of five [three] responses. Note that 
this has no effect on your payoffs. Your match is already over, and your payoffs are those 
recorded. 
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[TERMINATE MATCH WITH SEQUENCE OF "y" KEYSTROKES] 
On the Bottom part of the screen, you are told that the match is over, and that the 
next match will begin shortly. You are also prompted to record your payoffs, and the 
subject with whom you are matched. Please do that now. 
You are not being paid for the practice session, but if this were the real experiment, 
then the payoff you have recorded would be money you have earned from the first match, 
and you would be paid this amount for that match at the end of the experiment. The 
total you earn over all ten real matches is what you will be paid for your participation 
in the experiment. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD PAYOFFS] 
[HIT KEY TO START NEXT MATCH] 
You have now been matched with a new subject. The subject number of the subject 
with whom you are matched is in the upper right hand corner of your screen. We will 
now proceed to the second practice match. 
[MASTER HIT KEY] 
The second match has begun. The rules for the second match are exactly like the 
first. The RED subject gets the first move. 
[DO ALL P UNTIL BLUE's LAST MOVE] 
Now notice that it is BLUE's move. It is the last move of the match, The Top Pile 
now contains $3.08 [$2.82], and the Bottom Pile contains $0.12 [$0.38]. If the BLUE 
subject chooses TAKE, then the match ends. The BLUE subject receives the Top Pile 
and the RED subject receives the Bottom Pile. If the BLUE subject chooses PASS, one 
fourth of the Bottom Pile is moved to the Top Pile, and then the match ends. The RED 
subject receives the Top Pile, which now contains $3.11, [$2.92] and the BLUE subject 
receives the Bottom Pile, containing $0.09 [$0.28]. 
Will the BLUE subject please choose PASS by typing P at your terminal now. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE] 
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Appendix 2:  Experimental Data 
The following tables give the data for our experiment. Each row represents a Red subject. 
The columns are as follows 
COLUMN 1 :  Experiment number. 
COLUMN 2 :  Subject number of Red player. 
C OLUMN 2+ j :  Outcome of match j .  This is the number of passes before the first Take. 
The matching scheme used is the same as in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) .  In match j ,  
Red subject i i s  matched with Blue subject [ (i + j - l)modm], where m is the number
of subjects of each color in the experiment. Thus, with twenty total subjects, in the first 
match Red i is matched with blue i. In the second match, Red i is matched with Blue 
1 + i, except for Red 10, who is matched with Blue 1. 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 6 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 1 
1 7 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 8 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 
1 9 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 
1 10 1 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Experiment 1 
CIT 10 move 
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2 1 . 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 
2 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 4 2 1 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 6 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 7 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 8 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 10 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Experiment 2 
CIT 10 move 
3 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 
3 6 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 
3 7 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 9 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
Experiment 3 
UI 10 move 
4 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 
4 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 4 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
4 5 2 4 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 
4 6 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 
4 7 6 1 3 3 3 1 1 ·1 0 3 
4 8 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 
4 9 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 
4 10 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Experiment 4 
UI 10 move 
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5 i 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 
5 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 4 5 
5 4 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 1 
5 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 7 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 
5 8 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
5 9 0 0 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Experiment 5 
PCC 10 move 
6 1 5 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 
6 2 2 9 1 3 4 5 2 3 1 1 
6 3 0 2 4 5 4 3 3 1 1 1 
6 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 1 
6 5 6 5 3 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 
6 6 5 4 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 
6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 8 3 4 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 
6 9 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 4 1 
6 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Experiment 6 
PCC 10 move 
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 4 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 
7 5 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 7 l 1 1 0 0 ·O  ·-0 0 0 0 
7 8 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
7 9 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 10 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Experiment 7 
CIT 6 move 
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8 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
8 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
8 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
8 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 8 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
8 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
8 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Experiment 8 
UI 6 move 
9 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 
9 3 4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
9 4 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 
9 5 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
9 6 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
9 7 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
9 8 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 
9 9 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 
Experiment 9 
PCC 6 move 
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Figure 5: Quanta! Response Equilibrium of the Six-Move Constant-Sum Cen­
tipede Game. 
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